Sadr and his Al Mahdi Army Essential to Governing Iraq

Shiite politicians met with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in this Shiite holy city, and then said they had thrown their support behind Sadr, who demands a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq rather than the temporary increase under consideration in Washington. Haider Abadi, a leader of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party:

The Sadr movement is part of Iraqi affairs. We won't allow others to interfere to weaken any Iraqi political movement.

Ali Adeeb, another member of the Dawa Party, said Shiite leaders, including the prime minister, would resist U.S. efforts to sideline Sadr and his Al Mahdi army.

The Iraqi government decides what it thinks is necessary for the interest of the political process.

He added that Sadr's participation was essential to improve Iraq's political and security problems.

Baghdad's Deck Furniture

The prestigeous think tank known as The International Crisis Group doesn't think Baker and Hamilton's ad hoc Iraq Study Group is realistic about the so-called elected parliamentary government in Baghdad. It states that it is past time to make

an honest assessment of where things stand. Hollowed out and fatally weakened, the Iraqi state today is prey to armed militias, sectarian forces and a political class that, by putting short term personal benefit ahead of long term national interests, is complicit in Iraq’s tragic destruction. Not unlike the groups they combat, the forces that dominate the current government thrive on identity politics, communal polarisation, and a cycle of intensifying violence and counter-violence. Increasingly indifferent to the country’s interests, political leaders gradually are becoming warlords. What Iraq desperately needs are national leaders.

Two consequences follow.

• The first is that, contrary to the Baker-Hamilton report’s suggestion, the Iraqi government and security forces cannot be treated as privileged allies to be bolstered; they are simply one among many parties to the conflict. The report characterises the government as a “government of national unity” that is “broadly representative of the Iraqi people”: it is nothing of the sort. It also calls for expanding forces that are complicit in the current dirty war and for speeding up the transfer of responsibility to a government that has done nothing to stop it. The only logical conclusion from the report’s own lucid analysis is that the government is not a partner in an effort to stem the violence, nor will strengthening it contribute to Iraq’s stability. This is not a military challenge in which one side needs to be strengthened and another defeated. It is a political challenge in which new consensual understandings need to be reached. The solution is not to change the prime minister or cabinet composition, as some in Washington appear to be contemplating, but to address the entire power structure that was established since the 2003 invasion, and to alter the political environment that determines the cabinet’s actions.
• The second is that it will take more than talking to Iraq’s neighbours to obtain their cooperation. It will take persuading them that their interests and those of the U.S. no longer are fundamentally at odds. All Iraqi actors who, in one way or another, are participating in the country’s internecine violence must be brought to the negotiating table and must be pressured to accept the necessary compromises. That cannot be done without a concerted effort by all Iraq’s neighbours, which in turn cannot be done if their interests are not reflected in the final outcome. For as long as the Bush administration’s paradigm remains fixated around regime change, forcibly remodelling the Middle East, or waging a strategic struggle against an alleged axis composed of Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, neither Damascus nor Tehran will be willing to offer genuine assistance. Though they may indeed fear the consequences of a full-blown Iraqi civil war, both fear it less than they do U.S. regional ambitions. Under present circumstances, neither will be prepared to save Iraq if it also means rescuing the U.S.

And More:

There is no magical solution for Iraq. But nor can there be a muddle-through. The choice today could not be clearer. An approach that does not entail a clean break vis-à-vis both Iraq and the region at best will postpone what, increasingly, is looking like the most probable scenario: Iraq’s collapse into a failed and fragmented state, an intensifying and long-lasting civil war, as well as increased foreign meddling that risks metastasising into a broad proxy war. Such a situation could not be contained within Iraq’s borders. With involvement by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors and given that rising sectarianism in Iraq is both fuelled by and fuels sectarianism in the region, the more likely outcome would be a regional conflagration. There is abundant reason to question whether the Bush administration is capable of such a dramatic course change. But there is no reason to question why it ought to change direction, and what will happen if it does not.

Iraqi Army Doesn't Contain the Answer

Nicole Stracke is a researcher in the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. She writes for Arab News:

Among the 79 recommendations listed by the Iraq Study Group . . . those listed under 50 and 51 can be considered the most important. These state that “the entire Iraqi national police” and “the entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense” and thus tries to promote the institutions of the Iraqi military significantly over that of the Iraqi police forces. Given that the current police forces are heavily infiltrated by militias and have lost much credibility and public support, promoting Iraqi Army institutions would appear to be the key to enhancing security in Iraq. The question, however, is to what degree can these recommendations actually be implemented? The current Iraqi government has no interest in promoting the role of the army. Since the establishment of this government in May 2006, the army has only played a marginal role in securing the country. The Iraqi Constitution subjects the army to the political leadership. Accordingly, Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is commander-in-chief of the armed forces; he is in charge of the military institution of the country, including the appointment of the defense minister. Rather than re-building and promoting the army, the Maliki government decided to cushion its political power by politicizing the police forces and allying them with the diverse armed militias. The government’s intention to limit the army’s influence, restrain its capability and make it rely on the police was clearly demonstrated in the prime minister’s proposal to the Parliament in July 2006 wherein Maliki suggested recalling 80,000 troops from the disbanded Iraqi Army, but with 60,000 of them going to the police forces and only 20,000 actually re-employed by the army. This proposal came at a time when it was already well known that many parts of the police forces were corrupt, politicized and infiltrated by Shiite militias, and hence considered unreliable to be given the responsibility of stabilizing the country. But the proposal reflected the government’s style of governance whereby its power and protection are derived from various militias and a politicized police. The leadership and different political factions, including the prime minister’s Hizb Al-Dawa party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Al-Hakim group), and the Al-Sadr group, rely on armed militias which have been responsible for the destabilization of the country by competing with each other for control and power, thereby contributing to the collapse of security and pushing the country gradually to a sectarian and civil war. The promoting of army institutions by the government will thus undermine the role and influence of the militias and pave the way for them to eventually disarm and disband. This is likely to be met with stiff resistance by the militias and could lead to military clashes. At this point, the government would commit political suicide if it confronts its own militias since a withdrawal of the militias’ protection would leave an unpopular, isolated, weak government that is vulnerable and open to attacks from other radical Sunni and Kurdish groups, including Al-Qaeda. At the same time, the possibility of the present government rebuilding the army institutions should be treated with caution. Due to the unpopularity of the Maliki government and its reliance on militias, the willingness of army officers to support the present government and accept its legitimacy is not an easy option. Despite the constitution specifying that the military is subject to the political leadership, it is unlikely that the Iraqi Army will respect the chain of command ending with a civilian prime minister, and it is improbable that the army officers will be loyal to a government that has brought the country close to civil war. Given the constitutional supremacy of the Iraqi political leadership over the military institution, there are basically two options available for implementing the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation on promoting the Iraqi Army institutions. First, the US would have to promote and impose the divorce of the Iraqi Army from the control of the state’s political leadership, thereby de-politicizing the army institutions. The Iraqi Army would then be independent from the Iraq political leadership and only be linked through its defense minister, who must not be a civilian but a professional, experienced army officer standing above any political and sectarian affiliation. He would be the final decision-maker in the chain of command not subjected to any political party, and as the de facto commander-in-chief he would be in charge of the Iraqi security and police forces. At this point, a number of high-ranking Iraqi Army officers would have already been recalled to service, commanding about three to four divisions from the former disbanded Iraqi Army. These officers and soldiers would have neither been part of Saddam’s clan nor known to be loyal to him; in fact, some of them would have been excluded from important army duties during Saddam’s reign. Some have even operated in exile in Britain and the US before coming back to Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. While these army officers represent diverse sectarian groups, they are dedicated to maintain the state’s integrity and stability, and are not politicized or infiltrated by the militias. These divisions from the “new Iraqi army” would be deployed in Baghdad first. To create a credible force, the US would need to change its policy and attitude toward the Iraqi Army by supplying it with modern and effective arms and equipment, besides providing air and logistical backing. Once deployed, with US assistance, the Iraqi Army would stand in the frontline to crack down on militias and terrorist groups ruling the country. A second option is declaring a state of emergency. According to the Iraqi Constitution, the declaring a state of emergency would require a two-thirds parliamentary vote and a joint agreement of the president and prime minister. Once declared, the prime minister would suspend or dissolve Parliament, dismiss the government and “willingly” hand power to the military leaders to restore or establish “law and order.” At this point, it seems rather unlikely that Maliki or other political leaders would agree to such a decision. Similar to the re-establishment of the military institutions, this would amount to political suicide for a leadership that has established its power and influence under the umbrella of the US and its occupation forces. Once the army takes direct responsibility for the country’s security, there would be no guarantee that the civilian government would be able to reestablish the political order. Given that Iraqi history has witnessed six successful military coups, this scenario would abolish the civilian control and establish a military leadership. It is worth noting that since the establishment of the Iraqi Parliament, the 30-day state of emergency has been in effect continuously with the Parliament renewing the emergency every month. Since the current state of emergency is under the control of the civilian government, it has not been effective. In both the options, the Iraqi Army could garner public support by taking direct responsibility for the security of the country and providing much-needed stabilization policies. The current government is unpopular; Iraqis have no trust in the police forces or the US troops. Attacks, suicide bombings, sectarian clashes and kidnappings determine the daily life of the average Iraqi and have demoralized the citizens. Therefore, it is likely that a majority of Iraqis would welcome and support a strong leadership which is able to reestablish law and order. There is no doubt that the Iraqi Army’s image suffered under Saddam’s leadership; however, the military institutions in Iraq are traditionally strong and respected. Throughout the history of Iraq, the regular army — and certainly not the regime’s protection forces such as the Republican Guard — has more than once demonstrated its ability to serve as a national instrument, standing above ethnic, sectarian, and regional affiliations.

A Ballotocracy is not a Democracy

Who's in Charge, Here?
Association of Muslim Scholars'(AMS) Suleiman Harith al-Dhari, Iraq's leading Sunni cleric, who is wanted under an arrest warrant issued this month for inciting sectarian violence, accused the government on Saturday of bias.



Radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose Baghdad powerbase of Sadr City was the target of Thursday's bombs which killed 202 people, urged Dari on Friday to issue a fatwa, or religious ruling, prohibiting the killing of Shi'ites.






Sadr's aides also threatened to pull out of the government if Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki went ahead with a planned meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush in Jordan next week.

Maybe NeoCons Didn't Care About What Followed Saddam

Interesting discussion of David Wurmser in Dick Cheney's Office:

Like Hannah, who came to the OVP from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Wurmser traipsed a roundabout path to Cheney’s staff: He worked with Hannah at WINEP in the 1990s, and then went to AEI, where he directed Middle East affairs, to the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans, to John Bolton’s arms control shop at the State Department, and then to the OVP.

Even among ardent supporters of Israel, Wurmser -- and his wife, Meyrav, who runs the Hudson Institute’s Middle East program -- is considered an extremist. In 1996, the Wurmsers, Perle, and Feith co-authored the famous “Clean Break” paper for then–Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu, which called for radical measures to redraw the map of the entire Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Palestine) to benefit Israel.

Later, in a series of papers and a book, Wurmser argued that toppling Saddam was likely to lead directly to civil war and the breakup of Iraq, but he supported the policy anyway:

The residual unity of [Iraq] is an illusion projected by the extreme repression of the state.

After Saddam, Iraq will

be ripped apart by the politics of warlords, tribes, clans, sects, and key families. Underneath facades of unity enforced by state repression, [Iraq’s] politics is defined primarily by tribalism, sectarianism, and gang/clan-like competition.

Yet Wurmser explicitly urged the United States and Israel to “expedite” such a collapse.

The issue here is whether the West and Israel can construct a strategy for limiting and expediting the chaotic collapse that will ensue in order to move on to the task of creating a better circumstance.

Robert Dreyfuss, Vice Squad

One Militia Thug Begets Another Militia Thug

As the White House begins to rethink its policy on Iraq, savage new warlords are battling for power and the country is starting to splinter.

As the self-appointed defender of his Shia kith and kin, his nom de guerre is "The Shield". But to his Sunni foes – and many of his own people – only one name does justice to the savagery with which Abu Deraa wages Iraq's sectarian war. He is, they say, the "Shia Zarqawi".

Less than six months after an American airstrike ended Abu Musab al Zarqawi's campaign of Sunni terror, an equally brutal fanatic has emerged on the other side of the religious divide. Abu Deraa's trademark method of killing is a drill through the skull rather than a sword to the neck, but his work rate is just as prolific as the former al-Qaeda leader's and shows the same diabolical artistry.

In the past year, he and his followers are thought to have murdered thousands of Sunnis, their victims' bodies symbolically dumped in road craters left by al-Qaeda car bombs. The rise of monsters such as Abu Deraa is another blow to American hopes that Zarqawi's death, in June, would halt the sectarian violence, which now regularly claims 100 lives a day.

In the strategy rooms of Baghdad's Green Zone, the question of how to stop the violence escalating into civil war has acquired renewed urgency since President George W Bush's losses in last week's US midterm elections, and his sacking of the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld.

Yet, according to diplomats, the Green Zone is no longer the powerhouse of bright ideas for the future of Iraq that it once was. Until as recently as last year, every ambitious state department intern and junior Foreign Office mandarin was keen to do at least a six-month stint there, keen to help forge democracy in one of the toughest environments ever. Today, though, the brightest and the best and have left, giving it the atmosphere of a place being wound down. Few up-and-coming diplomats, it seems, want "Iraq 2006" on their CVs, much less "Iraq 2007". One insider:

Working there is becoming like an albatross around people's necks. The feeling is that it doesn't matter how many hours a day they do, it won't make any difference. And nobody wants to be around if they end up getting helicoptered out, Saigon-style.

Meanwhile, out in the "Red Zone", as those diplomats now call it, residents face a future in which thugs such as Abu Deraa play an ever more prominent role. So great is the risk of being killed in tit-for-tat violence that Iraqi tattoo parlours are offering "death tags", showing names and next of kin. Such inkings are a safeguard against ending up among the countless -unidentified bodies in Baghdad's morgue.

Yet, while Abu Deraa may have replaced Zarqawi at the top of the American wanted list, Iraq's Shia-dominated government has shown a marked reluctance to sanction the kind of large-scale operation necessary to arrest him in his stronghold of Sadr City, a vast Shia slum in east Baghdad. Taking action against him could cost it valuable support among other Shia militias who, despite official disdain for Abu Deraa's bloodthirstiness, value the fear that such a loose cannon inspires in their enemies.

The worsening of inter-religious- bloodshed reflects badly on the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose chief task when he took power in June was to win back Sunni confidence in the political process by stamping out the state's tacit backing of Shia militias such as the Mehdi Army.

Yet, increasingly, men such as Abu Deraa appear to operate beyond anyone's control at all. He is among at least 20 former Mehdi Army commanders who are pursuing their own agendas, sometimes sectarian, often simply criminal. The former commander, Moqtada al Sadr, may be a thug himself, but at least he represented a single, identifiable authority. If dozens of freelance players emerge alongside him, negotiation becomes impossible.

Dr Eric Herring, the British author of Iraq in Fragments, a study released last year which charts Iraq's break-up into innumerable competing factions.

The whole thing is becoming increasingly localised, with people like Sadr being outflanked by extremists whom he can't control. It's possible that we may eventually remember Sadr as a moderate.

Telegraph